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ANYTHING BUT COMMON:
NEW YORK’S “PENDING OR ANTICIPATED
LITIGATION” LIMITATION TO THE COMMON
INTEREST DOCTRINE CREATES MORE
PROBLEMS THAN IT SOLVES
Eric A. Franz*
Abstract: New York’s highest court recently handed down Ambac v. Countrywide, a
decision that has major ramifications in the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) world. Once
parties sign a merger or acquisition agreement, they share a common interest in ensuring that
both parties comply with applicable laws, a process that requires legal communications with
each other’s attorneys. Under the common interest doctrine, Delaware and the majority of
federal circuits apply the attorney-client privilege to shield many of these communications
from discovery. However, Ambac upset M&A attorneys’ reliance on the common interest
doctrine by holding that parties to a merger waive their attorney-client privilege when they
share legal advice with the other entity’s attorneys, unless the communications relate to
pending or anticipated litigation. In addition to the M&A world, Ambac will have negative
consequences for many business entities attempting to comply with the law on advice from
counsel during major transactions. While a number of commentators have addressed the
litigation requirement tangentially, there is currently no thorough evaluation of the state of
this requirement, which has special relevance in the post-Ambac world. This Comment
evaluates the history and purpose of the common interest doctrine and surveys the current
state of the law across multiple jurisdictions. This Comment then argues that Ambac’s
litigation requirement is contrary to the purpose of the attorney-client privilege—to
encourage persons and entities to freely seek legal advice in order to comply with the law.
Finally, this Comment urges the many jurisdictions with underdeveloped law on the common
interest doctrine to reject Ambac’s restrictive litigation requirement.

INTRODUCTION
The attorney-client privilege plays an important role in our legal
system to encourage “full and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the
observance of law and administration of justice.”1 The Supreme Court of
the United States has placed great emphasis on clarity when defining the
scope of the privilege. As the Court noted, an uncertain privilege is “no
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, University of Washington School of Law. Many thanks to Andrew Escobar
for providing the idea for this Comment, and for his helpful feedback. Thank you also to Professor
Maureen Howard for her critical direction and feedback. Finally, thank you to the Washington Law
Review editing team, without which this piece would not be possible.
1. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989).

983

15 - Franz.docx (Do Not Delete)

984

5/28/2017 3:40 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:983

privilege at all”2 because if there is doubt as to whether a legal
communication is discoverable, clients are much less likely to make that
communication to their attorney3—thereby contravening the privilege’s
purpose.
Clients may waive the attorney-client privilege if they disclose their
communications to third parties.4 The common interest doctrine is
perhaps the most confusing aspect of third-party waiver. The common
interest doctrine allows a client to avoid waiving the attorney-client
privilege by disclosing an otherwise privileged communication to a third
party, when the client and the third party share a common legal interest.5
The common interest doctrine began as a “joint defense” doctrine in
criminal cases,6 and later expanded to civil cases as well.7 While many
jurisdictions have adopted the common interest doctrine, the details of
the doctrine differ based on jurisdiction, and many jurisdictions have not
adopted a common interest doctrine in the civil arena at all.8
One particularly muddled aspect of the common interest doctrine
recently thrust itself front and center in the mergers and acquisitions
world: the litigation requirement, which allows the common interest
doctrine to protect communications only when those communications
relate to litigation.9 States and the federal circuits differ widely on
whether they have adopted or even addressed the litigation
requirement.10
New York’s highest court recently gave a lengthy defense of the
litigation requirement in Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc.11 The Ambac majority and dissenting opinions disagreed
2. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
3. Id. at 392–93.
4. See, e.g., Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that a
party waived attorney-client privilege by voluntarily disclosing communications to a social worker).
5. See Morgan v. City of Federal Way, 166 Wash. 2d 747, 757, 213 P.3d 596, 601 (2009) (“The
presence of a third person during the communication waives the privilege, unless the third
person . . . has retained the attorney on a matter of ‘common interest.’”) (citations omitted).
6. Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 822, 841–42 (1871) (reasoning that the exception was
justified because the parties “had the same defen[s]e to make”); see also Ambac Assur. Corp. v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 36 (N.Y. 2016) (describing the “joint defense”
doctrine’s origins in Chahoon).
7. See, e.g., Schmitt v. Emery, 2 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1942) (expanding the common interest
doctrine to civil cases) (overruled on other grounds); UNIF. R. EVID. 502(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1999).
8. See infra Part III.
9. See Ambac, 57 N.E.3d 30 (adopting the litigation requirement).
10. See infra Part III.
11. 57 N.E.3d at 38.
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sharply about whether a litigation requirement is doctrinally sound,
supported by historical precedent, and supported by policy
considerations.12 This Comment argues that jurisdictions should reject
Ambac’s formulation of the litigation requirement for three reasons.
First, Ambac’s assertion that courts need not ensure that the common
interest doctrine advances the full disclosure purpose of the attorneyclient privilege is doctrinally unsound.13 Second, the litigation
requirement is not necessary to ensure broad discovery because the
common interest doctrine is limited by the other requirements of the
attorney-client privilege: it only covers legal communications, not
business communications or underlying facts.14 Third, the litigation
requirement is contrary to the full disclosure purpose of the attorneyclient privilege, and it will result in poorer legal advice, produce less
compliance with the law, and encourage gamesmanship.15
This Comment proceeds in five Parts. Part I discusses the attorneyclient privilege and waiver generally as context for a discussion of the
common interest doctrine. Part II traces the history and current state of
the common interest doctrine. Part III focuses narrowly on the litigation
requirement and surveys the current state of the requirement (or lack
thereof) in state and federal jurisdictions. Part IV discusses the Ambac
case, which adopts a litigation requirement and frames the common
interest doctrine as an “exception” to third-party waiver of the attorneyclient privilege. Finally, Part V argues that jurisdictions should reject
Ambac’s litigation requirement as an arbitrary and doctrinally unsound
limitation on the common interest doctrine—and therefore on the
attorney-client privilege itself. Part V therefore urges jurisdictions to
reject Ambac’s rationale for a litigation requirement.
I.

THIRD-PARTY WAIVER LIMITS THE SCOPE OF
COMMUNICATIONS THAT THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE PROTECTS

The common interest doctrine prevents third-party waiver of the
attorney-client privilege.16 Thus, it is important to first understand the

12. See generally id.
13. See infra section V.A.
14. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395–96 (1981); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
15. See infra section V.C.
16. See, e.g., Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 35 (“[W]here two or more clients separately retain counsel to
advise them on matters of common legal interest, the common interest exception allows them to
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attorney-client privilege and waiver generally. Scores of scholars have
addressed the attorney-client privilege and waiver.17 This Part attempts
to provide information sufficient to allow the reader to evaluate the
common interest doctrine in its proper context. In particular, this Part
provides background on the full disclosure purpose of the attorney-client
privilege and the third-party waiver doctrine.
A.

All Jurisdictions Protect Legal Communications Between Attorneys
and Their Clients

The attorney-client privilege is “the oldest of the privileges for
confidential communications known to the common law.”18 The
privilege applies to corporations as well as individuals19 and applies
equally to communications that relate to litigation and those that do
not.20 There is no one-size-fits-all approach to the attorney-client
privilege; instead, a web of statutes and common law governs.21
On the federal level, Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 501 covers
privileges:22
The common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the
light of reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege
unless any of the following provides otherwise:
the United States Constitution;
a federal statute; or
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.

shield from disclosure certain attorney-client communications that are revealed to one another for
the purpose of furthering a common legal interest.”) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
17. See, e.g., 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290 (John T.
McNaughton rev. 1961); PAUL R. RICE ET AL., 2 ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE U.S. (2d ed.
1999); KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (7th ed. student ed. 2006).
18. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 805 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding
that attorney-client privilege covered submission of invention record to corporate legal counsel for
the purpose of obtaining legal advice); Adler v. Greenfield, 990 N.E.2d 1219, 1237 (Ill. Ct. App.
2016) (holding that attorney-client privilege covered legal, estate-planning oriented communications
between attorney and client’s representative).
21. On the federal level, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 governs privileges and gives federal courts
leeway to interpret privileges in light of the common law. Some states extensively codify their
attorney-client privilege and its exceptions—examples are Delaware (DEL. R. EVID. 502), Idaho
(IDAHO R. EVID. 502), and North Dakota (N.D. R. EVID. 502). Other states rely almost exclusively
on the common law to define privileges—examples are West Virginia (W. VA. R. EVID. 501) and
Wyoming (WYO. R. EVID. 501).
22. FED. R. EVID. 501.
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But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim
or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.23
The Judiciary Committee rejected a proposed FRE 501 that enumerated
nine specific privileges and instead determined that it was best to leave
specific privileges to the common law.24 Judiciary Committee Notes to
FRE 501 indicates that Congress left full discretion to judges to define
and apply privileges “in the light of reason and experience.”25 The
attorney-client privilege on the federal level—as well as the other
privileges—is now a matter of federal common law. Therefore, federal
judges have wide latitude to interpret the privilege in light of its
purposes.
Courts widely apply the standard formulation of the privilege that was
created by Professor John Henry Wigmore:
1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought 2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, 3) the
communications relating to that purpose, 4) made in confidence
5) by the client, 6) are at his insistence permanently protected 7)
from the disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, 8) except
the protection be waived.26
The burden is on the party asserting the privilege to prove each of these
elements by a preponderance of the evidence.27
State privilege rules apply in state cases and in federal civil cases
where state law provides the rule of decision.28 Most states address the
attorney-client privilege through state statutes and state rules of
evidence, while other states apply attorney-client privilege solely as a
matter of common law.29

23. Id.
24. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650 at 8–9 (1973), http://federalevidence.com/pdf/FRE_Amendments/
1975_Orig_Enact/House%20Report%2093-650%20(1974).pdf [https://perma.cc/87V2-DBPX].
25. Id.
26. WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 2292, at 554. See also United States v. Bisanti, 414 F.3d 168, 171
(1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Prof. Wigmore’s language); United States v. Landof, 591 F.2d 36, 38 (9th
Cir. 1978) (same).
27. See, e.g., Ralls v. United States, 52 F.3d 223, 225 (9th Cir. 1995) (“A party asserting the
attorney-client privilege has the burden of establishing the relationship and the privileged nature of
the communication.”).
28. FED. R. EVID. 501.
29. Compare W. VA. R. EVID. 501 (closely mirroring Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and providing
that privileges are governed by the common law), with ARK. R. EVID. 502 (statutorily defining
attorney-client privilege).
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In all jurisdictions, the attorney-client privilege protects only legal
communications.30 To successfully invoke the privilege for a specific
communication, the purpose of the communication must have been to
obtain legal advice from the client’s attorney.31 The underlying facts of a
communication are not privileged,32 nor are communications for the
purpose of obtaining business advice.33 A communication is not
privileged where it “neither invited nor expressed any legal opinion
whatsoever, but involved the mere soliciting or giving of business
advice.”34
In defining the scope of the attorney-client privilege, all jurisdictions
agree that it must be shaped by its purposes. The next section discusses
the primary, overarching purpose of the privilege: to improve legal
representation by encouraging clients to make full disclosure to their
attorneys.35
B.

The Purpose of the Attorney-Client Privilege Is Full Client
Disclosure

The primary purpose of the attorney-client privilege is “to encourage
full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice.”36 The United States Supreme Court37 has long
recognized the importance to the legal system of “encourag[ing] clients
to make full disclosure to their attorneys.”38 Full disclosure enables
attorneys to represent their clients adequately.39 However, clients who

30. See, e.g., N.H. R. EVID. 502 Reporter’s Notes (“Generally the [attorney-client] privilege does
not exist when consultation is held with a lawyer as a friend or in some business capacity not
involving the rendering of legal advice or services.”).
31. Id.
32. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395–96 (1981); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
33. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950).
34. Id.
35. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395–96.
36. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989).
37. Some states have codified their attorney-client privilege rules. In those states, the analysis
may be less governed by common law and more by the code. That said, common law principles still
play a role and the purposes of attorney-client privilege still apply. For that reason, this Part focuses
on the federal common law of attorney-client privilege.
38. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390 (citing United States v. Nashville R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915)).
39. Id.
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fear their communications will be disclosed may withhold important
facts from their attorneys.40
Encouraging full and frank communication between clients and
lawyers helps ensure that the clients comply with the law. This benefits
clients, the legal system, and society as a whole.41 Without full
information from clients, attorneys are more likely to give inaccurate
advice that leads their clients down a path of noncompliance or poor
litigation strategy.42 The Supreme Court recognizes that the privilege’s
application must be predictable to serve its purposes.43 Both attorneys
and clients need to know which communications they can expect to
shield from discovery.44 If there is doubt as to whether legal
communications are discoverable, clients are much less likely to make
those communications to their attorneys.45
An example of how the full disclosure purpose shapes the privilege is
the seminal case of Upjohn Co. v. United States, which relied on the
purpose of full disclosure in rejecting a lower court’s “control group”
test for the communications of corporate employees.46 The control group
test would have limited the corporate attorney-client privilege to the
communications of senior management, on the grounds that only senior
management personify the client corporation when it communicates with
its counsel.47 The Court rejected the control group test on three related
grounds. First, that middle and lower-level employees often possess the
information needed by corporate counsel to ensure that the corporate
40. Id.
41. Id. at 389 (attorney-client privilege “is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and
administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its
practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the
consequences or the apprehension of disclosure”) (quoting Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470
(1888)).
42. As a practical matter, if the client knows that damaging information could more readily be
obtained from the attorney following disclosure than from himself in the absence of disclosure,
the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully
informed legal advice.
Katherine Traylor Schaffzin, An Uncertain Privilege: Why the Common Interest Doctrine Does Not
Work and How Uniformity Can Fix It, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 49, 57 (2005) (quoting Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1972)).
43. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393 (“[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the
attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular
discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results
in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.”).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 392–93.
46. Id. at 396.
47. Id. at 390.
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client complies with the law.48 Second, that not extending the attorneyclient privilege to communications by middle and lower-level employees
would discourage “the communication of relevant information by
employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the
client corporation.”49 Third, the control group test prevented legal
communications from counsel to middle and lower-level employees
“who will put into effect the client corporation’s policy.”50 The chilling
effect on communication would inhibit the kind of sound legal advice
that promotes the “broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice.”51
Upjohn is an example of the Supreme Court using a practical
approach to define the bounds of the attorney-client privilege to ensure
that full disclosure and sound legal advice were possible between
corporate clients and their counsel. The Court recognized that it had the
power to shape the privilege with “the principles of the common law
as . . . interpreted . . . in the light of reason and experience.”52 It noted
that corporations face “a vast and complicated array of regulatory
legislation”53 that is “hardly an instinctive matter,”54 and rejected a test
that would limit the corporation’s ability to comply with such
legislation.55 In doing so, Upjohn suggested an approach to attorneyclient privilege that emphasizes function over form.
C.

Third-Party Disclosure Waives the Attorney-Client Privilege

The attorney-client privilege applies to communications made in
confidence.56 Disclosure of such a communication to a third-party often
waives the privilege because it signals an indifference to
48. Id. at 391.
49. Id. at 392.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 389.
52. Id. at 397 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501).
53. Id. at 392.
54. Id. (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 440–41 (1978)).
55. For a detailed analysis of the attorney-client privilege and the common interest exception as
applied to major business transactions, see Anne King, Note, The Common Interest Doctrine and
Disclosures During Negotiations for Substantial Transactions, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1411 (2007).
Note, however, that King assumes a “pending or anticipated litigation” requirement applies to the
common interest exception. Id. at 1424 (“The common interest doctrine may also apply before
litigation occurs, as long as the parties anticipate being possible targets of litigation in the area of
their common interest.”) (citations omitted). This is a requirement not present in several
jurisdictions and one that this Comment argues against. See infra Parts III, V.
56. See Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2007).
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confidentiality.57 It is not a client’s subjective intention that triggers
waiver, but rather whether the client objectively demonstrates the proper
respect for confidentiality.58 For that reason, careless third-party
disclosures constitute waiver,59 but disclosures under duress or deception
do not.60
With the exception of enumerated waiver provisions in Federal Rule
of Evidence 502 and in some state statutes, common law dictates which
persons or entities constitute third parties for purposes of waiver.61
Courts have held that disclosure to an auditor,62 to a social worker,63 and
to a wider audience via blog or e-mail64 constitute third-party waiver.
However, two clients represented by the same attorney may disclose
privileged communications relating to the represented matter to each
other without waiving the privilege.65 Courts recognize that the purposes
of the attorney-client privilege are best served by those clients being able
to communicate with each other in this setting, where both clients expect
that the communications will be privileged as to the outside world, but
not between each other.66 For the same reasons, communications to
some agents of the client,67 to the lawyer’s staff,68 or to an interpreter69

57. Id.
58. WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 2327.
59. See, e.g., O’Leary v. Purcell Co., 108 F.R.D. 641, 644 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (holding that the
attorney-client privilege may be waived by a careless, unintentional, or inadvertent disclosure).
60. SEC v. Forma, 117 F.R.D. 516, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
61. See FED. R. EVID. 502 (enumerating some forms of waiver).
62. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
63. See Maday v. Pub. Libraries of Saginaw, 480 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2007).
64. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. C 07-03783 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 4286329, at *3–5 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 22, 2010).
65. James M. Fischer, The Attorney-Client Privilege Meets the Common Interest Arrangement:
Protecting Confidences While Exchanging Information for Mutual Gain, 16 REV. LITIG. 631, 634
(1997) (“The ‘joint client’ privilege attaches when the clients are represented by a common lawyer.
Communications among the clients and their common lawyer remain privileged as against third
parties, and the joint client privilege applies to both litigated and nonlitigated matters.”).
66. Id. at 648 (“[C]onfidentiality is preserved because the values associated with the disclosure to
the third person outweigh the interests in treating the privilege as having been waived.”).
67. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 70 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST.
2000) (“A lawyer may disclose privileged communications to other office lawyers and with
appropriate nonlawyer staff—secretaries, file clerks, computer operators, investigators, office
managers, paralegal assistants, telecommunications personnel, and similar law-office assistants.”).
69. See People v. Osario, 549 N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (N.Y. 1989) (“[C]ommunications made to
counsel through a hired interpreter, or one serving as an agent of either attorney or client to facilitate
communication, generally will be privileged.”).
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generally do not constitute waiver because these parties are necessary to
further legal representation.
The waiver analysis is inseparable from the attorney-client privilege
analysis because the extent of waiver defines the scope of the privilege.70
This connected nature between the privilege itself and waiver of the
privilege is shown by the fact that generally the party claiming attorneyclient privilege must establish lack of waiver as an element of the
privilege.71 In this sense, waiver simply describes a circumstance in
which the attorney-client privilege does not apply. In either case, the
privilege does not cover the communications, and a judge will likely
deny a claim of privilege and order the communications to be disclosed.
For these reasons, the waiver rules must further the purposes of the
attorney-client privilege because they are fundamentally aimed at the
same goal: balancing liberal discovery rules against the societal benefit
from clients’ full disclosure that facilitates sound legal advice and
compliance with the law.
One area of waiver that has caused considerable confusion is the
common interest doctrine, often referred to as the common interest
exception.72 The common interest doctrine allows a client to avoid
waiving the attorney-client privilege by disclosing an otherwise
privileged communication to a third party when the communication
relates to a common legal interest shared by the parties.73
The common interest doctrine is often invoked to protect
communications between parties on the same side of litigation and their
separate attorneys.74 Some jurisdictions strictly limit application of the
70. See, e.g., In re Keeper of Records (Grand Jury Subpoena Addressed to XYZ Corp.), 348 F.3d
16, 22 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[T]he party who invokes the privilege bears the burden of establishing that
it applies to the communications at issue and that it has not been waived.”).
71. See id.; Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30 (N.Y. 2016)
(“Generally, communications made in the presence of third parties, whose presence is known to the
[client], are not privileged from disclosure” because they are not deemed confidential.”) (quoting
People v Harris, 442 N.E. 2d 1205, 1208 (N.Y. 1982)). But see Sampson v. Sch. Dist. of Lancaster,
262 F.R.D. 469, 478 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (“As the party challenging the privileged communication,
Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that Defendants waived the privilege.”).
72. Courts and scholars refer to the common interest doctrine by many names, including the
common interest exception. See infra Parts IV–V. While “exception” indicates correctly that the
common interest doctrine is not a standalone privilege, the term “exception” causes its own
problems by suggesting that the common interest analysis is separate and apart from the waiver
analysis. See infra Part V. For that reason, this Comment uses “common interest doctrine.”
73. See Morgan v. City of Federal Way, 166 Wash. 2d 747, 757, 213 P.3d 596, 601 (2009) (“The
presence of a third person during the communication waives the privilege, unless the third
person . . . has retained the attorney on a matter of ‘common interest.’”) (citations omitted).
74. See, e.g., State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wash. 2d 799, 815, 259 P.2d 845, 854 (1953); Schmitt v.
Emery, 2 N.W.2d 413 (Minn. 1942).
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common interest doctrine to co-parties in litigation that retain separate
attorneys.75 In contrast, many jurisdictions extend the common interest
doctrine to protect communications that relate to non-litigation common
interests, such as prospectively seeking legal advice to comply with laws
or regulations.76 To understand how this jurisdictional split evolved and
what it means for the law of privilege, the next Part discusses the origins
and development of the common interest doctrine itself.
II.

THE COMMON INTEREST DOCTRINE EVOLVED FROM
CRIMINAL LAW INTO A WIDESPREAD—YET MUDDLED—
CIVIL LAW DOCTRINE

The common interest doctrine began as a “joint defense” doctrine in
criminal cases.77 Over time it has expanded to cover a broader range of
legal communications in both civil and criminal contexts.78 While many
jurisdictions have adopted some form of the common interest doctrine,
the details of the doctrine differ based on jurisdiction, and many
jurisdictions have not adopted a common interest doctrine in the civil
arena at all.79 This Part addresses the doctrine’s scope and history in the
federal circuits and the states.
A.

The Common Interest Doctrine’s Broad Contours

The common interest doctrine is still evolving, and many jurisdictions
have yet to address or apply it at all.80 Yet the doctrine shares some traits
among most of the jurisdictions that have adopted it.81 First, most
common interest doctrine jurisdictions describe the common interest
doctrine either as part of the general attorney-client privilege rule, or as
an exception to waiver of the attorney-client privilege, not as a separate,

75. See, e.g., Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 30 (adopting the litigation requirement).
76. See United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 815–16 & n.6 (7th Cir. 2007) (clients
need only “undertake a joint effort with respect to a common legal interest”).
77. See Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 822, 841–42 (1871) (reasoning that the exception
was justified because the parties “had the same defen[s]e to make”).
78. See, e.g., UNIF. R. EVID. 502(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999); Schmitt, 2 N.W.2d 413
(expanding the exception to civil cases).
79. See infra Part III.
80. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-5-501 (2016) (leaving attorney-client privilege to the common
law). The Supreme Court of Georgia has not yet addressed the common interest doctrine. This
pattern is followed in several other states, including Illinois (ILL. R. EVID. 502), Indiana (IND. R.
EVID. 502), Iowa (IOWA R. EVID. 5.502), and others.
81. See infra section II.C.1.
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standalone privilege.82 Thus, the common interest doctrine only protects
communications to third parties that would have already been covered
by the attorney-client privilege if they were made in confidence between
a client and the client’s attorney.83 For that reason, communications with
a non-legal purpose are not covered.
Second, the common interest doctrine protects communications
between clients with separate attorneys.84 While some jurisdictions use
the term “common interest” to describe application of the attorney-client
privilege to separate clients with the same attorneys, that situation is
generally already covered under separate principles of the common law
attorney-client privilege.85 Throughout its history, from its inception as
the joint-defense doctrine to the modern common interest doctrine, the
common interest doctrine has operated to protect disclosures to separate
attorneys that would otherwise waive the attorney-client privilege.86 The
Restatement also takes this approach by expressly stating that the
common interest doctrine applies to communications between clients
that are “represented by separate attorneys.”87
Third, disclosure to third parties other than those sharing a common
legal interest waives the privilege.88 A common example is where a
meeting of clients and their separate counsel happens to include a third
party who is not a client with a common interest or an attorney of such a
client. Imagine that officers of a corporate client hold an in-person
82. The Uniform Rules of Evidence, adopted by at least eleven states, includes the common
interest language in its “General Rule of Privilege.” UNIF. R. EVID. 502(b)(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1999). But see In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 362 (3d Cir. 2007) (describing the
“Community-of-Interest (Or Common Interest) Privilege” (emphasis added)).
83. For example, business communications without a legal component are generally not covered
by the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. GAF Roofing Mfg. Corp., No. 93
Civ. 5125, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 671 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1996) (communications with lawyer
serving purely as negotiator not privileged).
84. See, e.g., UNIF. R. EVID. 502(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999) (protecting legal communications
“by the client or a representative of the client or the client’s lawyer or a representative of the lawyer
to a lawyer or a representative of a lawyer representing another party in a pending action and
concerning a matter of common interest therein”).
85. See Fischer, supra note 65, at 634.
86. See Schaffzin, supra note 42, at 59.
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000)
(“If two or more clients with a common interest in a . . . matter are represented by separate
lawyers . . . a communication of any such client . . . that relates to the matter is privileged as against
third persons.”) (emphasis added).
88. See, e.g., Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 35 (N.Y.
2016) (“‘Generally, communications made in the presence of third parties, whose presence is known
to the [client], are not privileged from disclosure’ because they are not deemed confidential.”)
(quoting People v. Harris, 442 N.E. 2d 1205, 1208 (N.Y. 1982)).
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meeting with the corporation’s attorney and an outside advertising
consultant. In this scenario, legal communications in the presence of the
outside consultant waive the attorney-client privilege because they are
disclosed to a third party that does not share a common legal interest
with the corporation—although they may share a common business
interest.89 Because the communication to that third party by definition
cannot be for the purpose of securing legal counsel on the matter of
common interest, the common interest doctrine does not apply to shield
those communications.90
Fourth, while jurisdictions differ as to how common the common
interest must be, jurisdictions generally require the parties to be on the
same side of some kind of legal issue. Co-parties in litigation therefore
may generally invoke the common interest doctrine to prevent disclosure
of their communications regarding litigation strategy with their separate
counsel.91 But parties negotiating at arms-length generally cannot invoke
the common interest doctrine because the interest in a successful
negotiation is not a sufficiently common interest.92 For that reason, legal
communications to a legal adversary’s attorney in settlement
negotiations are generally not covered by the common interest
doctrine—there is no common legal interest in a particular legal outcome
because the parties’ legal objectives are different.93 The same goes for
corporations negotiating a merger: until they sign a merger agreement, it
is much less likely that they share a common legal interest because there
is no shared legal interest in the resulting entity complying with the law
before the parties have agreed to create the entity.94
B.

The Joint Defense Doctrine Emerged in a Criminal Case

The modern common interest doctrine has its roots in criminal law
with the joint defense doctrine.95 In 1871, the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia in Chahoon v. Commonwealth held that three defendants in a
criminal conspiracy case were entitled to the attorney-client privilege in
regards to communications made in a private meeting with two of the

89. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950).
90. Id.
91. See Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 626–27.
92. King, supra note 55, at 1412–13 (“Most courts conclude that disclosures made during
transaction negotiations work a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.”).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 822 (1871).
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three defendants’ attorneys present.96 Importantly, no persons other than
the defendants and their lawyers were present, as the presence of an
unrelated third party would certainly have waived the privilege.97
Although Chahoon did not fully define the criminal joint defense
doctrine, the case forecasted some parameters of what would eventually
evolve into the civil common interest doctrine. First, it applies to
communications between a client and a separate attorney of another
client.98 Second, the communications must be for a legal purpose shared
in common between the clients.99 This means that communications
between clients represented by separate attorneys without attorneys
present are not covered because client-to-client conversations are de
facto not for the purpose of obtaining legal counsel and thus are not
protected by the attorney-client privilege in the first place.
The Chahoon court justified the extension of the criminal attorneyclient privilege as follows:
Under such circumstances, it was natural and reasonable, if not
necessary, that these parties, thus charged with the same crimes,
should meet together in consultation with their counsel,
communicate to the latter all that might be deemed proper for
them to know, and to make all necessary arrangements for the
defen[s]e.100
While Chahoon was decided a century before Upjohn, the purpose of
encouraging full disclosure is evident in the opinion.101 Communication
between co-defendants and their counsel is important to ensure
competent legal advice, and Chahoon allowed that kind of
communication in the criminal arena.

96. Id. at 839–40.
97. Id. at 839 (“There were present at that meeting all three of the accused, Chahoon, Sands and
Sanxay; and John M. Gregory, counsel representing Sands, and John Lyon, counsel representing
Sanxay. The counsel of Chahoon was absent. It does not appear that any other person was present
on the occasion than those above named, and it may well be inferred that there was not.”).
98. See id.; Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 35 (N.Y.
2016).
99. Id.
100. Chahoon, 62 Va. at 839.
101. Id.
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The Joint Defense Doctrine Expanded into a Civil Common
Interest Doctrine That Has Gained Acceptance in Many
Jurisdictions

The criminal joint defense doctrine eventually evolved into a civil
common interest doctrine. In 1942, the Supreme Court of Minnesota was
the first court to adopt a civil common interest doctrine.102 In Schmitt v.
Emery, the Court held that the statement of a civil defendant, made for
the purpose of litigation, remained privileged when the statement was
provided to a co-defendant’s counsel for a legal purpose.103 The parties
had a joint legal interest in shielding the statement from disclosure, and
the statement was provided to the co-defendant’s counsel “solely to
accommodate [the attorney] and thereby to enable them to make their
effort and aid more effective in the common cause of excluding the
statement.”104
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not provide an extensive rationale
for its holding.105 That said, the civil common interest doctrine furthers
the full disclosure purpose of the attorney-client privilege that the
Chahoon court relied on to create the criminal doctrine. Indeed, in a
recent dissent in New York State’s highest court, justices supporting a
broad common interest doctrine argued that full disclosure “furthers the
goal of compliance with the law, thus benefitting not only clients but
society in general.”106 This dissent also pointed out that “clients often
seek legal advice specifically to comply with legal and regulatory
mandates,”107 echoing Upjohn’s acknowledgement that full disclosure
and effective representation are intertwined.108
The civil common interest doctrine has gained broad acceptance.
Every jurisdiction to address the doctrine applies it. The Restatement has
also adopted civil common interest doctrine, as follows:
If two or more clients with a common interest in a litigated or
nonlitigated matter are represented by separate lawyers and they
agree to exchange information concerning the matter, a
communication of any such client that otherwise qualifies as
102. See Schmitt v. Emery, 2 N.W.2d 413, 416–17 (Minn. 1942).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 417.
105. See id.
106. Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 41 (N.Y. 2016)
(Rivera, J., dissenting).
107. Id.
108. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981).
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privileged under §§ 68–72 that relates to the matter is privileged
as against third persons. Any such client may invoke the
privilege, unless it has been waived by the client who made the
communication.109
Additionally, most commentators accept that at least some form of the
common interest doctrine is good law.110
The broad acceptance of the common interest doctrine is likely
because it is necessary to avoid unequal application of the rules of
evidence to clients who are represented by separate—as opposed to the
same—counsel, even though the legal matter of representation is
identical. For example, imagine two plaintiffs file a joint complaint
against an employer for wrongful termination. Next, the plaintiffs meet
in person with their joint attorney to discuss their litigation strategy. The
attorney-client privilege protects these communications. Now imagine
the same set of facts, but instead of a single attorney, each plaintiff
retains separate counsel, who work together on the case. Assume that
each plaintiff shares a common legal interest: a judgment against the
defendant. Because Plaintiff One and the attorney for Plaintiff Two do
not have a lawyer-client relationship, that attorney is a third party with
respect to Plaintiff One. In this scenario, absent the common interest
doctrine, a litigation strategy meeting with both plaintiffs and both
attorneys in the room would result in third-party waiver of the attorneyclient privilege.
Some commentators argue against the common interest doctrine on
the basis that the doctrine is contrary to the “traditional approach of
applying the [attorney-client] privilege narrowly.”111 The common
interest doctrine technically does extend the attorney-client privilege to
communications between two parties that do not have an attorney-client
relationship themselves.112 However, this is not the only context in
which courts have extended the privilege to third parties when necessary
to ensure sound legal advice. For example, courts extend the privilege to
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
110. Even in more restrictive jurisdictions, the debate over the common interest doctrine tends to
focus less on whether it should exist at all, and more on what the proper scope of the exception
should be. Compare Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 38 (majority opinion) (“[A]ny benefits that may attend
such an expansion of the doctrine are outweighed by the substantial loss of relevant evidence, as
well as the potential for abuse.”), with id. at 43 (Rivera, J., dissenting) (noting that “[s]everal legal
commentators also support a broad application of the privilege”).
111. Grace M. Giesel, Comment, End the Experiment: The Attorney-Client Privilege Should Not
Protect Communications in the Allied Lawyer Setting, 95 MARQUETTE L. REV. 475, 559 (2011).
112. Id. at 479 (“When the privilege is applied in the allied lawyer setting, however, the privilege
protects communications that are not between an attorney and that attorney’s clients.”).
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legal communications in the presence of a translator.113 Additionally, the
broad acceptance of the doctrine indicates that jurisdictions understand
the fundamental unfairness that would result from the above-described
scenario.114 The jurisdictions adopting the common interest doctrine
recognize that as long as the parties can prove that a common legal
interest exists, the doctrine should apply.115
Despite the areas of overlap, the common interest doctrine remains
shrouded in confusion and ambiguity. Jurisdictions differ on numerous
aspects of the doctrine, including the circumstances in which it applies,
the terminology used to refer to the doctrine, and even whether the
doctrine is part of waiver itself, an exception to waiver, or a standalone,
separate privilege.116
D.

Anything but Common: The Muddled State of the Common Interest
Doctrine

Since Schmitt, the common interest doctrine has become muddled in
both nomenclature and application. Major differences include how
common the common interest must be, whether the common interest
doctrine requires a written agreement, and who may waive the privilege
under the common interest doctrine.117 This subsection addresses the
confused terminology and status of the doctrine. The following
subsection addresses a particularly impactful jurisdictional split: some

113. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961).
114. In many cases, separate counsel may suggest less commonality of interest than in the joint
client setting. However, the common interest exception still requires parties to show a “common
legal interest.” See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 366 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that
multiple clients represented by the same attorney must have nearly identical legal interests for the
attorney to represent them, whereas in the separate-attorney context, “courts can afford to relax the
degree to which clients’ interests must converge without worrying that their attorneys’ ability to
represent them zealously and single-mindedly will suffer”).
115. Notably, the presence of even a single unrepresented party may preclude application of the
common interest exception, because at that point the communication regarding that third party
cannot be for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. See, e.g., Cavallaro v. United States, 153 F.
Supp. 2d 52, 61 (D. Mass. 2001) (“Under the strict confines of the common-interest doctrine, the
lack of representation for the remaining parties vitiates any claim to a privilege.” (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (“If two
or more clients with a common interest in a . . . matter are represented by separate lawyers . . . a
communication of any such client . . . that relates to the matter is privileged as against third
persons.”)).
116. See infra section II.D.
117. Schaffzin, supra note 42, at 68–90 (discussing these differences and advocating for a
uniform approach).
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jurisdictions apply the common interest doctrine to legal
communications only in the context of litigation.
Courts have conflated several similar terms and used the term
“common interest” to refer to related but distinct privilege doctrines.118
The fact that several jurisdictions have not yet addressed the common
interest doctrine—or only addressed it indirectly—has furthered the
confusion.119 Commentators have begun to cry out for a consistent
statement of the circumstances to which the common interest doctrine
applies.120 Indeed, it is difficult to define the scope of the doctrine when
it is alternately referred to by several different terms—terms that may
refer to a completely different doctrine in another jurisdiction.121
One of many examples of this confusion features prominently in the
1994 D.C. Circuit case, In re Sealed Case.122 First, the Court of Appeals
uses the term “common interest privilege,”123 which implies—
incorrectly—that the common interest doctrine is a standalone privilege
as opposed to part of the attorney-client privilege. Second, the party
refers to the “joint defense privilege” as only applying to the “new
phenomenon”124 of “joint defense arrangements”125—even though the
“joint defense doctrine” applied to co-defendants in civil cases as far
back as 1942.126 Third, neither the Court nor the party in the case
claiming the common interest exception adequately distinguishes it from
the “joint defense privilege,” from which the common interest exception
evolved.127 Fourth, another court following the citations in the case will
find very different formulations of the exception, making it difficult to
define and apply.
In re Sealed Case is useful not only as an example of the confused
state of the doctrine generally, but also as an example of the difficulty
this confusion creates for practitioners who seek to invoke the exception
on behalf of their clients. The appellant in In re Sealed Case claimed the

118. See Fischer, supra note 65, at 632–34.
119. See infra Part IV.
120. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 65; Schaffzin, supra note 42; Jared S. Sunshine, Seeking
Common Sense for the Common Law of Common Interest in the D.C. Circuit, 65 CATH. U. L. REV.
833 (2016).
121. See Fischer, supra note 65, at 632–34.
122. In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
123. Id. at 719.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Schmitt v. Emery, 2 N.W.2d 413, 416–17 (Minn. 1942).
127. See generally In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715.
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“joint-defense privilege” at the court below.128 The United States as
respondent on appeal attempted to distinguish the “joint-defense
privilege” from the “common interest privilege,” and argued that the
appellant waived the latter because he did not raise it below.129 The
Court rejected this argument on the basis that “[a]lthough the
Government is correct in noting that the appellant concentrated his
argument on the joint defense privilege in district court, he also asserted
the common interest privilege.”130 To support its conclusion, the Court
of Appeals quoted a portion of the district court record in which the
appellant referred to a “common law privilege about common interests:”
In terms of the joint defense issue, your honor—and I know the
court knows this—there’s a common law privilege, not
pertaining to joint defense agreements per se—joint defense
agreements are a new phenomenon—but there’s a common law
privilege about common interests. If clients have common
interests, the privilege applies. And that’s what we’re talking
about here.131
The Court of Appeals then stated its formulation of the common
interest doctrine, but in doing so it cited sources that provide very
different formulations of the doctrine.132 Finally, the Court of Appeals
remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to determine
whether the communications at issue were really between two separate
entities.133
The confused state of the common interest doctrine has real
consequences. The less sure clients are that the common interest doctrine
applies to a particular legal communication, the more likely clients are to
refrain from fully disclosing facts to their attorneys. As the United States
Supreme Court noted in Upjohn, “if the purpose of the attorney-client
privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able to predict
with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be
protected.”134

128. Id. at 719.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
132. Id. (citing both the Fifth Circuit, which applies a narrow formulation of the common interest
exception, and Prof. Wigmore, who provides a broader formulation of the common interest
exception).
133. Id.
134. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
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Commentators have begun to take note of this confusion and have
made valiant efforts to clarify the doctrine and to define its scope.135
Consistent terminology across jurisdictions—at the very least—would
be immensely helpful. These commentators generally agree that the
common interest doctrine should be defined so that 1) it can be easily
distinguished from related but distinct doctrines, and 2) to make clear
that the common interest doctrine is part of the attorney-client privilege
and waiver analyses, not a separate, standalone privilege.136
While a uniform terminology is not out of the question, a uniform
scope of the common interest doctrine is far less likely to become
reality. In addition to the confused nomenclature, jurisdictions differ on
a particularly important doctrinal aspect of the exception: some
jurisdictions only apply the common interest doctrine to privileged
communications made during or in anticipation of litigation, while
others allow the doctrine to cover legal communications made without
the looming threat of litigation.137 Practitioners who seek to invoke the
common interest doctrine are well-served by understanding their
jurisdiction’s position on the litigation requirement.
III. JURISDICTIONS DIFFER ON WHETHER PARTIES CAN
INVOKE THE COMMON INTEREST DOCTRINE TO
PROTECT LEGAL COMMUNICATIONS THAT DO NOT
RELATE TO LITIGATION
One of the most impactful differences between jurisdictions is
whether the common interest doctrine only applies in the context of
some form of litigation, or whether it also applies to non-litigation legal
contexts such as estate or business planning. The approach adopted by
Delaware,138 most federal circuits that have addressed the common
interest doctrine,139 and the Restatement140 allows the common interest
doctrine to apply to both litigated and non-litigated matters.

135. See Fischer, supra note 65; Schaffzin, supra note 42, at 69; Sunshine, supra note 120.
136. See Fischer, supra note 65; Schaffzin, supra note 42, at 69; Sunshine, supra note 120.
137. See infra Part III.
138. See D.R.E. 502(b) (attorney-client privilege covers legal communications that relate to a
“matter of common interest”) (omitting a litigation requirement).
139. See In re Regents of Univ. of Calif., 101 F.3d 1386, 1390–91 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Schaeffler v.
United States, 806 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2015); In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 364
(3d Cir. 2007); United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816 (7th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987).
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
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In contrast, the Uniform Rules of Evidence (“URE”), adopted by a
number of states, requires a “pending action” in order for a party to
invoke the common interest doctrine.141 Under the URE approach, coparties or potential co-parties in litigation can invoke the common
interest doctrine, but clients obtaining legal advice in the absence of
litigation cannot—even though common legal interests occur in many
non-litigation contexts.142 For example, entities that have signed a
merger agreement may not face immediate litigation, but they share a
common legal interest in ensuring that the ensuing merger transaction
complies with the relevant statutes and regulations. Even in jurisdictions
that impose a litigation requirement, the scope of that requirement
differs: jurisdictions disagree on whether litigation must be actual,
pending, or anticipated.143
A.

The Majority Federal Approach Does Not Impose a Litigation
Requirement

A majority of federal circuits that have addressed the common interest
doctrine do not require actual, pending, or anticipated litigation. These
circuits include the Federal,144 Second,145 Third,146 Seventh,147 and
Ninth148 Circuits. The First Circuit has a less-developed common interest
doctrine jurisprudence but has stated in dicta that “the privilege
sometimes may apply outside the context of actual litigation,”149 placing
it somewhat close to the majority of federal circuits. The Eighth Circuit,
while not as clear as the others, has noted that “[t]he rule applies ‘not
only if litigation is current or imminent but, consistently with the rest of
the Standard, whenever the communication was made in order to
facilitate the rendition of legal services to each of the clients involved in

141. UNIF. R. EVID. 502(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999); see also The Litigation Requirement in
States, infra notes 267–317 tbl.2.
142. UNIF. R. EVID. 502(b).
143. See id. (“pending action”); Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57
N.E.3d 30, 38 (N.Y. 2016) (“pending or anticipated”); O’Boyle v. Borough of Longport, 94 A.3d
299 (N.J. 2014) (“actual or anticipated”); Hewes v. Langston, 853 So. 2d 1237, 1244 (Mississippi
2003) (“pending action”).
144. See In re Regents of Univ. of Calif., 101 F.3d at 1390–91.
145. See Schaeffler v. United States, 806 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2015).
146. See In re Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 364 (3d Cir. 2007).
147. See United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816 (7th Cir. 2007).
148. See United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987).
149. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 572 (1st Cir. 2001).
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the conference.’”150 However, the Ninth Circuit, which does not require
actual litigation, has not addressed whether some threat of litigation is
nevertheless required.151
The Fifth Circuit is the only circuit that imposes a concrete litigation
requirement. Under this approach, a plaintiff must show:
[A] palpable threat of litigation at the time of the
communication, rather than a mere awareness that one’s
questionable conduct might some day result in litigation, before
communications between one possible future co-defendant and
another . . . could qualify for protection.152
Absent actual litigation or a “palpable threat” of litigation in the Fifth
Circuit, a party cannot invoke the common interest doctrine.153
The remaining circuits either have not addressed a litigation
requirement or are unclear on whether they adopt one. For example, the
Fourth Circuit appeared to reject the litigation requirement when it stated
that “it is unnecessary that there be actual litigation in progress for this
privilege to apply.”154 Unfortunately, in that case the Fourth Circuit
applied what it called the common interest doctrine to facts in which
multiple clients were represented by a single attorney155—a formulation
that describes in reality the co-client doctrine, not the common interest
doctrine. For that reason, it remains unclear whether the Fourth Circuit
would apply the litigation requirement to the commonly understood
formulation of the common interest doctrine in which separate attorneys
represent clients with common legal interests.

150. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 939 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting JACK
B. WEINSTEIN ET. AL., WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 503[06] (1987) [hereinafter
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE]).
151. See United States v. Gonzalez, 669 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2012); Zolin, 809 F.2d at 1417.
152. In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d 705, 711 (5th Cir. 2011).
153. Id.
154. Hanson v. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., 372 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2004).
155. Id.
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Table 1:
The Litigation Requirement in the Federal Circuits
Rejected
the Litigation
Requirement156
Federal Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit

Adopted the
Position on the Litigation
Litigation
Requirement Unclear158
Requirement157
Fifth Circuit
First Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
D.C. Circuit

The majority approach of the federal circuits that reject a litigation
requirement is echoed by the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers159 and by Professor Weinstein.160 The Restatement is the most
explicit of all in rejecting a litigation requirement:
If two or more clients with a common interest in a litigated or
nonlitigated matter are represented by separate lawyers and they
agree to exchange information concerning the matter, a
communication of any such client . . . that relates to the matter
[of common interest] is privileged as against third persons.161
The uncertainty regarding the scope of the common interest doctrine
on the federal level might have been avoided by a proposed Federal Rule
156. Schaeffler v. United States, 806 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2015); In re Teleglobe Commc’ns
Corp., 493 F.3d 345, 364 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 816
(7th Cir. 2007); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 939 (8th Cir. 1997); In re
Regents of Univ. of Calif., 101 F.3d 1386, 1390–91 (Fed. Cir. 1996); United States v. Zolin, 809
F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987).
157. In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d at 711 (“[T]here must be a palpable threat of litigation at
the time of the communication, rather than a mere awareness that one’s questionable conduct might
some day result in litigation, before communications between one possible future co-defendant and
another . . . could qualify for protection.”).
158. In re IPCom GmbH & Co., KG, 428 F. App’x 984, 986 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Hunton &
Williams v. U.S. DOJ, 590 F.3d 272, 283 (4th Cir. 2010) (declining to address whether the presence
of adverse party is a prerequisite for invoking the common interest doctrine); In re Qwest
Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Almeida, 341 F.3d
1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 2003); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 572 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[T]he
privilege sometimes may apply outside the context of actual litigation.”).
159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
160. WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 150, § 503.21[2].
161. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 76(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000)
(emphasis added).
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of Evidence 503 in 1972. The Supreme Court Advisory Committee
proposed thirteen specific rules on privileges, including Rule 503, which
“would have codified the attorney-client privilege and would have
recognized the common interest doctrine.”162 The proposed Rule
explicitly rejected the pending litigation requirement in the URE in favor
of the approach adopted by Delaware, requiring only a “matter” of
common interest:
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing
confidential communications made for the purpose of
facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the
client, (1) between himself or his representative and his lawyer
or his lawyer’s representative, or (2) between his lawyer and the
lawyer’s representative, or (3) by him or his lawyer to a lawyer
representing another in a matter of common interest, or (4)
between representatives of the client or between the client and a
representative of the client.163
However, “Congress rejected Article V of the Court’s Proposed Rules
in its entirety, including Proposed Rule 503(b).”164 Instead, the House
Judiciary Committee “through a single rule, 501, left the law of
privileges in its present state and further provided that privileges shall
continue to be developed by the courts of the United States.”165 The
Advisory Committee Notes indicate Congress’s concern that “[m]any of
these rules contained controversial modifications or restrictions upon
common law privileges.”166 By not enacting a specific Rule for each
privilege, “the House provided that privileges shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience.”167 This standard provides
wide discretion for judges to fashion and interpret privileges. It also has
the effect of allowing judges to consider the practical consequences of
the privileges. The result is disparate application of the common interest
doctrine across federal circuits,168 with some federal circuits rejecting
the litigation requirement, some adopting it, and still more unclear.
162. Schaffzin, supra note 42, at 87.
163. Id. (emphasis added); see also PAUL R. RICE, 1 ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE
UNITED STATES § 2:1 (2d ed. 1999).
164. Id.
165. FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee’s notes to 1974 enactment.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See The Litigation Requirement in the Federal Circuits, supra notes 156–58 tbl.1.
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States Differ Widely on the Litigation Requirement

As in the federal circuits, there is no clear majority for or against a
litigation requirement in the states.169 The litigation requirement received
a major boost when it was included in the Uniform Rules of Evidence
(URE) in 1999170:
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any
other person from disclosing a confidential communication
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional
legal services to the client . . . (3) by the client or a
representative of the client or the client’s lawyer or a
representative of the lawyer to a lawyer or a representative of a
lawyer representing another party in a pending action and
concerning a matter of common interest therein . . . .171
It is unclear why the Uniform Law Commission (ULC)—the drafter
of the URE— included the litigation requirement. The Comment to Rule
502 is silent on the “pending action” language.172 The ULC states on its
website that the URE “reflects closely the federal rules of evidence.”173
However, Rule 501 provides that the federal common law governs
privileges, and the majority federal circuit approach rejects this litigation
requirement.174 One scholar suggests that “[m]any state legislatures
enacted evidentiary rules modeled after Proposed [Federal] Rule 503(b),
which was never enacted by Congress.”175 However, if that were the
case, one would expect these states to use the “common interest”
language in that proposed rule, rather than the “pending action”
language in the URE.
169. See The Litigation Requirement in the States, infra notes 267–317 tbl.2.
170. See UNIF. R. EVID. 502(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999) (“General Rule of privilege. A client
has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing a confidential
communication made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to
the client (1) between the client or a representative of the client and the client’s lawyer or a
representative of the lawyer; (2) between the lawyer and a representative of the lawyer; (3) by the
client or a representative of the client or the client’s lawyer or a representative of the lawyer to a
lawyer or a representative of a lawyer representing another party in a pending action and
concerning a matter of common interest therein; (4) between representatives of the client or
between the client and a representative of the client; or (5) among lawyers and their representatives
representing the same client.”) (emphasis added).
171. Id. (emphasis added).
172. See UNIF. R. EVID. 502 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999).
173. Rules of Evidence, UNIF. LAW COMM’N: THE NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Rules%20of%20Evidence [https://perma.
cc/26JY-H2S9].
174. See supra section III.A.
175. See Schaffzin, supra note 42, at 86 n.135.
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Further, the rationale for adopting the URE’s “pending action”
language does not appear in state cases interpreting URE 502(b). At least
one state court refers to their URE-based attorney-client privilege statute
as “essentially codif[ying] the common law attorney-client privilege,”176
with no discussion of how the litigation requirement is nowhere to be
found in all but one federal circuit’s formulation of the common interest
doctrine.
At least eleven states have adopted the URE’s common interest
language without change.177 Many more states have not adopted the
URE’s attorney-client privilege language, and many states’ rules differ
from the URE’s in significant ways.178 Significant differences exist even
among some states that have adopted a common interest doctrine similar
to that in the URE.179 For example, while the URE requires a pending
action, New Jersey applies the common interest doctrine to
“communications for different parties if the disclosure is made due to
actual or anticipated litigation for the purpose of furthering a common
interest.”180
The differences are even greater among states that have not adopted
the URE. For example, Delaware, a major jurisdiction for corporate
transactions, applies a relatively broad version of the common interest
doctrine and rejects a litigation requirement.181 Delaware’s relevant
statutory provision, D.R.E. 502(b)(3), states that the attorney-client
privilege covers disclosures to an attorney or client “representing
another in a matter of common interest.”182
In contrast to Delaware’s statutory clarity, many other states have not
addressed the common interest doctrine at all.183 Among the non-URE
176. Hampton Police Ass’n, Inc. v. Town of Hampton, 20 A.3d 994, 1001 (N.H. 2011).
177. See Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 36 n.2 (N.Y.
2016) (citing ARK. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); HAW. R. EVID. 503(b)(3); KY. R. EVID. 503(b)(3); ME. R.
EVID. 502(b)(3); MISS. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); N.H. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); N.D. R. EVID. 502(b)(3); 12
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2502(B)(3) (2017); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-502(b)(3) (2017); TEX. R.
EVID. 503(b)(1)(C); VT. R. EVID. 502(b)(3). But see DEL. R. EVID. 502(b)(3) (permitting disclosure
to an attorney or client “representing another in a matter of common interest”)).
178. See The Litigation Requirement in the States, infra notes 267–317 tbl.2.
179. See Hewes v. Langston, 853 So. 2d 1237, 1259 (Miss. 2003) (describing the common
interest exception as its own privilege: “The defendants to this suit now assert the attorney client
privilege, the work product privilege, and the common interest privilege”).
180. O’Boyle v. Borough of Longport, 94 A.3d 299, 317 (N.J. 2014) (emphasis added). “Pending
action” is a strict requirement that does not allow the doctrine to cover anticipated litigation.
181. DEL. R. EVID. 502(b)(3).
182. Id.
183. These states include Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3-105 (2017)) and Montana
(MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-803 (2017)).
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states that have adopted the common interest doctrine, many have yet to
address whether it requires litigation,184 leaving clients and attorneys
simply to guess whether their common interest communications are
privileged in the absence of some threat of litigation.185 Washington
State’s common interest doctrine jurisprudence is an example of this
uncertainty. The State of Washington does not define the common
interest doctrine by statute,186 and Washington State courts have not yet
addressed whether the doctrine requires the threat of pending or
anticipated litigation. The only examples of the common interest
doctrine thus far in Washington involved actual or potential co-parties in
litigation.
For example, in State v. Emmanuel, the Washington State Supreme
Court held that the doctrine applied when two parties and their counsel
communicated for the purposes of pursuing a common defense.187
However, no Washington State opinion expressly requires pending or
anticipated litigation, and some opinions describe the privilege in a way
that suggests pending or anticipated litigation might not be required.188
For example, in Sanders v. State, the Washington State Supreme Court
upheld the trial court’s application of the common interest doctrine to
communications related to litigation, but described the common interest
doctrine to apply if “the third person is necessary for the communication,
or has retained the attorney on a matter of ‘common interest.’”189 This
broader language suggests that Washington may not adopt a litigation
requirement.
Many courts have made valiant efforts to clear up the confusion in
their jurisdictions regarding the common interest doctrine, though
attempts to clarify have often only muddied the waters further.190 Others
have attained some level of clarity, though not always without
consequences for the doctrine.191 A primary example of the latter is the
184. See State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wash. 2d 799, 815, 259 P.2d 845, 855 (1953) (applying the
common interest doctrine in the litigation context, but not addressing the common interest doctrine
outside of the litigation context).
185. Id.
186. See generally WASH. R. EVID. 501–02.
187. Emmanuel, 42 Wash. 2d at 815, 259 P.2d at 855.
188. See, e.g., Sanders v. State, 169 Wash. 2d 827, 854, 240 P.3d 120, 134 (2010).
189. Id. (“The presence of a third person during the communication waives the privilege, unless
the third person is necessary for the communication, or has retained the attorney on a matter of
‘common interest.’”) (quoting Morgan v. City of Federal Way, 166 Wash. 2d 747, 757, 213 P.3d
596, 601 (2009) (en banc)).
190. See Fischer, supra note 65, at 632–34.
191. See infra Part V.
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recent case of Ambac v. Countrywide,192 in which New York’s highest
court adopted a pending or anticipated litigation requirement.
IV. NEW YORK ADOPTED A LITIGATION REQUIREMENT IN
AMBAC V. COUNTRYWIDE
In the midst of the confused state of the common interest doctrine,
New York’s highest court issued an opinion on the litigation requirement
that is significant for two reasons. First, the Ambac v. Countrywide
majority presented an alluringly clear analysis of the scope and purpose
of the common interest doctrine that is sorely lacking in other
jurisdictions.193 Second, the dissent presented an equally clear rebuttal
that outlined several prominent reasons against the litigation
requirement.194
The Ambac court held that in addition to the common legal interest
requirement, the common interest doctrine is also subject to a litigation
requirement: the doctrine does not apply to legal communications
between a corporation and another corporation’s lawyers unless those
communications relate to “pending or anticipated litigation.”195 While a
model of clarity compared to most other cases discussing the litigation
requirement, Ambac’s framing of the common interest doctrine as an
exception to waiver196 creates significant problems for the doctrine and
justifies a strict litigation requirement.
A.

The Ambac Majority Framed the Common Interest Doctrine as an
“Exception” to Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege and Defended
the Litigation Requirement

The Ambac majority’s definition of the common interest doctrine as
an exception to third-party waiver197 allowed the majority to assign
different purposes to the common interest doctrine than to the attorneyclient privilege as a whole.198

192. Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30 (N.Y. 2016).
193. Id.
194. Id. (Rivera, J., dissenting).
195. Id. at 38. “Anticipated” is broader than the U.R.E.’s “pending action,” but Ambac does not
clearly define the scope of “anticipated litigation.” The dissent criticizes the majority opinion for
this reason. See id. at 48 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 40.
197. Id. at 39.
198. Id.
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In Ambac, Bank of America and Countrywide Insurance publicly
announced a merger plan on January 11, 2008, and closed the deal on
July 1, 2008.199 The issue was whether the companies shared a common
legal interest between those dates such that the common interest doctrine
applied and shielded from discovery their communications with each
other’s lawyers.200 The court held that the common interest doctrine
required the presence of pending or anticipated litigation, and because
Bank of America and Countrywide did not provide evidence of such, the
doctrine did not apply and the attorney-client privilege was waived.201
The court rejected Bank of America’s argument that the constant threat
of litigation in mergers met the anticipated litigation requirement, and
the court required the threat of litigation to be specific, not general.202
In adopting the litigation requirement, Ambac presented a clear
version of the common interest doctrine as a whole. In an attempt to
resolve the confusion surrounding the terminology and operation of the
doctrine, the majority first determined that the general rule is that the
presence of a third-party waives the attorney-client privilege.203 It then
presented the common interest doctrine as an exception to that waiver.204
This allowed the majority to distinguish between the purposes of the
exception and the purposes of the attorney-client privilege as a whole.
The majority acknowledged that the attorney-client privilege is not tied
to the anticipation of litigation.205 However, it concluded that “the
common interest doctrine does not need to be coextensive with the
privilege because the doctrine itself is not an evidentiary privilege or an
independent basis for the attorney-client privilege.”206
Once it defined the common interest doctrine as an exception to
waiver, the majority justified the litigation requirement on several
grounds. In a nod to Upjohn, the majority acknowledged that in some
cases “the threat of mandatory disclosure may chill the parties’ exchange
of privileged information and therefore thwart any desire to coordinate
legal strategy.”207 But it determined that the threat of chilled
communication is lowest in non-litigation settings:
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id. at 38.
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[N]o evidence has been presented here that privileged
communication-sharing outside the context of litigation is
necessary to achieve those objectives . . . [W]hen parties share
attorney-client communications for planning purposes outside of
the specter of anticipated litigation, such as when parties
cooperate to strengthen or obtain patent protection . . . , it is
more likely that [they] would have shared information even
absent the privilege.208
The majority went on to conclude that “when businesses share a
common interest in closing a complex transaction, their shared interest
in the transaction’s completion is already an adequate incentive for
exchanging information necessary to achieve that end.”209
After concluding that there is a low disclosure benefit to the litigation
requirement, the majority expressed great concern with its costs.210 The
majority asserted that applying the common interest doctrine to nonlitigation-related legal communications “could result in the loss of
evidence of a wide range of communications between parties who assert
common legal interests but who really have only nonlegal or exclusively
business interests to protect.”211 The majority stated that absent the
litigation requirement “the potential for abuse [of the common interest
doctrine] is sufficiently great, and the accompanying benefits so few,”
that “expansion” is not warranted.212 The majority also asserted that their
approach “seems to have been the common law rule”213 and that “at least
eleven states have statutorily restricted the common interest doctrine to
communications made in furtherance of ongoing litigation.”214
B. The Ambac Dissent Rejected the Litigation Requirement
The Ambac dissent rejected the notion that the purpose of the
common interest doctrine is distinct from the purpose of the attorneyclient privilege as a whole.215 By doing so, the dissent rejected the

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. This statement is somewhat confounding given that the attorney-client privilege does not
apply to nonlegal communications in the first place.
212. Id. at 39.
213. Id. at 36 n.2.
214. The Ambac majority did not address the fact that the majority of federal circuits that have
adopted the common interest doctrine take the opposite approach.
215. Id. at 44–45 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
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litigation requirement as not fulfilling the attorney-client privilege’s
purpose.216
The dissent began with Upjohn’s purpose of full disclosure.217 It then
noted that the attorney-client privilege itself is not tied to the
contemplation of litigation because:
[L]itigation may not be the motivating factor leading to a
client’s communication of private information. Rather, “[l]egal
advice is often sought, and rendered, precisely to avoid
litigation, or facilitate compliance with the law, or simply to
guide a client’s course of conduct” . . . . All the more so in the
corporate context . . . .218
The dissent then rejected the litigation requirement and argued that the
requirement “ignores the unique common legal interests of parties to a
merger.”219 It also noted that “the majority of federal courts . . . and a
significant number of state jurisdictions . . . have held that the privilege
applies even if litigation is not pending or reasonably anticipated.”220
In contrast to the majority, the dissent relied on the attorney-client
privilege’s purpose in analyzing the common interest doctrine. The
dissent relied on Upjohn to note that corporate clients “often seek legal
advice specifically to comply with legal and regulatory mandates,”221
and that “the majority fails to identify any distinction between coparties
or person who reasonably anticipate litigation, and parties committed to
the completion of a merger”222 regarding how likely each party is to seek
full and frank legal advice.
Further, the dissent rejected the majority’s concern with abuse of the
common interest doctrine as “purely speculative,” and argued that “there
is certainly as much or more potential [for abuse] in assertions of the
[common interest doctrine] by those ‘anticipating’ litigation and seeking
to shield communications from a potential adversary.”223 The dissent
also argued that any attempted abuse of the common interest doctrine
absent a litigation requirement can “be addressed through our legal

216. Id.
217. Id. at 41 (“Effective representation furthers the goal of compliance with the law, thus
benefitting not only clients but society in general.”).
218. Id. at 41–42.
219. Id. at 43.
220. Id. at 42–43.
221. Id. at 41.
222. Id. at 45.
223. Id.
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system’s existing methods for preventing and sanctioning obstruction of
proper discovery.”224
The dissent further asserted that the Ambac majority’s formulation of
the litigation requirement actually creates more confusion about the
scope of the common interest doctrine.225 Under the majority’s
formulation, a party seeking to invoke the common interest doctrine
must show that litigation is either “ongoing or reasonably
anticipated.”226 The dissent seized on this standard, and argued that the
majority “ignores the inherent vagueness in the term. Indeed, whether
the parties reasonably anticipated litigation inevitably requires judicial
consideration of case-specific facts.”227
C.

Ambac’s Alluring Clarity is Misleading

Ambac appears to clarify and simplify a muddled doctrine, but it
creates more problems than it solves.228 The Ambac majority and dissent
define the common interest doctrine using clear and consistent terms.229
Early in its opinion, the majority acknowledged that the common interest
doctrine “has come to be known by many names”230 and stated that the
doctrine is not an independent privilege but an “exception to the general
rule that communications shared with third parties are not privileged.”231
Both the majority and dissent also made clear that the common interest
doctrine applies “where two or more clients separately retain counsel to
advise them on matters of common legal interest,”232 thereby
distinguishing the common interest doctrine from the co-client doctrines

224. Id.
225. See id.
226. Id. at 39 n.4.
227. Id. at 45.
228. Despite the recency of Ambac, one court has already cited the decision as persuasive
authority in interpreting South Carolina privilege law. See Wellin v. Wellin, 2016 WL 5539523, at
*12 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2016) (“The [common interest] doctrine is unquestionably available under
federal and New York privilege law, which is at least suggestive of South Carolina courts’ position
on the issue, given South Carolina courts’ tendency to cite to New York or federal privilege law.”)
(citing Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 43 (N.Y. 2016)).
229. See generally Ambac, 57 N.E.3d 30. In contrast to cases like In re Sealed Case, 29 F.3d 715
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (see supra section IV.D), Ambac consistently uses the term “common interest
doctrine” and does not mix it up with distinct terms like “joint defense doctrine,” “joint client
exception,” and so forth. Ambac also consistently refers to the common interest doctrine as applying
to representation on a matter of common interest by separate attorneys.
230. Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 35 n.1.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 35.
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with which it is so often confused. Moreover, the majority and dissent’s
disagreements about the scope of the common interest doctrine are
clearly delineated.
However, buried beneath the surface of the opinions are major
doctrinal differences between the majority and dissent that have real
consequences for clients, lawyers, and society as a whole. While the
dissent argued forcefully against the litigation requirement, it did not
make a direct attack on the majority’s framing of the common interest
doctrine as an exception to waiver of attorney-client privilege. Arguably,
the dissent implicitly rejected this framing by referring to it as the
common interest “doctrine.”233 Further, by asserting that the litigation
requirement should be rejected because it “does not derive from the
common-law roots of the attorney-client privilege,”234 the dissent may
have implicitly rejected the majority’s framing of the doctrine as a
separate, standalone exception to waiver of attorney-client privilege.
However, by not making a frontal attack on the idea of the common
interest doctrine as an “exception,” the dissent may have inadvertently
muddied the waters of the common interest doctrine further. Indeed, the
litigation requirement should be rejected precisely because the common
interest doctrine is not an exception to waiver, but rather part of the
waiver analysis itself and therefore subject to the purposes of the
attorney-client privilege.
V.

AMBAC’S LITIGATION REQUIREMENT IS DOCTRINALLY
UNSOUND AND AT ODDS WITH THE PURPOSE OF THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

Federal and state jurisdictions should reject Ambac’s litigation
requirement for both doctrinal and practical reasons. First, the common
interest doctrine should serve the full disclosure purpose of the attorneyclient privilege in Upjohn: to encourage the kind of full disclosure from
clients to attorneys in order to enable attorneys to provide competent
legal advice.235 This is particularly important in the world of major
corporate transactions, in which two separate entities with separate
counsel must work together to ensure compliance with an enormous

233. Id. at 43 (Rivera, J., dissenting).
234. Id.
235. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981).
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number of complex laws and regulations.236 The litigation requirement is
contrary to that purpose.237 Given that the attorney-client privilege itself
is not limited to the litigation context, a protected “common legal
interest” communication should not be so limited. Second, the cost of
rejecting the litigation requirement is low because as a part of attorneyclient privilege, the common interest doctrine only protects legal
communications—not business communications or underlying facts.238
Finally, the litigation requirement has practical consequences: it
disincentivizes full disclosure, and encourages potential plaintiffs to
engage in gamesmanship by withholding the threat of litigation until the
last possible moment. These practical consequences will likely lead to a
lower quality of legal advice, less compliance with the law, and more
litigation.
A.

Ambac Mischaracterizes the Common Interest Doctrine as an
Exception to Third-Party Waiver and Thereby Restricts its
Application in a Manner Contrary to the Attorney-Client
Privilege’s Purpose

Every state and federal circuit accepts that the attorney-client
privilege itself applies in non-litigation contexts. The privilege applies to
corporations as well as individuals,239 and it applies in both litigation and
non-litigation settings.240 The common interest doctrine should as well.
By characterizing the common interest doctrine as an exception to
waiver of attorney-client privilege, the Ambac majority arbitrarily limits
its application to legal communications made in anticipation of
litigation. The majority describes the common interest doctrine as “an
exception to the general rule that communications made in the presence
of or to a third party are not protected by the attorney-client
privilege.”241 This formulation allows the majority to limit the
236. King, supra note 55, at 1433 n.132 (“Heavy government regulation of corporations increases
the likelihood of government litigation against corporations, but also renders corporations more
vulnerable to suit by private parties.”); see also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.
237. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390.
238. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.
2000); Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395–96.
239. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
240. See, e.g., In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 805 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(attorney-client privilege applied to submission of invention record to corporate legal counsel for
the purpose of obtaining legal advice); Adler v. Greenfield, 990 N.E.2d 1219, 1237 (Ill. Ct. App.
2016) (attorney-client privilege applied to legal, estate-planning oriented communications between
attorney and client’s representative).
241. Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 37 (N.Y. 2016).
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application of the doctrine in a way it could not limit attorney-client
privilege as a whole, to communications made while litigation is
pending or anticipated: “[w]hile it is true that the attorney-client
privilege is not tied to the contemplation of litigation, the common
interest doctrine does not need to be coextensive with the privilege
because the doctrine itself is not an evidentiary privilege or an
independent basis for the attorney-client privilege.”242 In the common
interest context, the majority first determines that waiver has
presumptively occurred—and thus the privilege is vitiated—and then
fashions a narrow subset of attorney-client privilege and applies it to
legal communications in only one context: that of pending or anticipated
litigation. This creates a hurdle to protection in other circumstances,
even those in which parties meet the other “common interest” elements.
Doctrinally, however, the analytical process should be the reverse.
First, courts should look to the nature of the communication to determine
whether the client meets the elements of the attorney-client privilege. In
doing so, if a legal communication was disclosed to a third party who
shares a common legal interest, then courts should determine that there
simply has been no waiver. In that sense, the common interest doctrine is
a point of analysis to determine whether waiver has occurred at all—not
an exception to disclosure when waiver has occurred.
This distinction matters because if the common interest doctrine is
framed as a part of the waiver analysis, it is subject to the full disclosure
purpose of attorney-client privilege, as opposed to a separate exception
for which courts can create a separate analysis that is not subject to the
purposes of Upjohn. Part of the waiver analysis is the parties’
expectations of what will remain private.243 If clients make legal
communications in the presence of other parties that share a common
legal interest, the analysis should be that there has been no waiver in the
first place. For this reason, the type of communication covered by the
common interest doctrine should be the same as that covered by the
attorney-client privilege as a whole.
Anticipating litigation may be one concrete external motive that
signifies a client’s intent to seek legal advice that remains confidential,
but it is hardly the only one. Clients—particularly corporate clients—
also seek legal advice to ensure that their future actions are lawful.244 By
242. Id. at 39.
243. See, e.g., Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, 990 A.2d 650, 663 (N.J. 2009) (privilege not
waived when plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails sent over a cloud-based email account on a company computer).
244. See King, supra note 55, at 1425 n.84.
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recognizing the common interest doctrine, jurisdictions have accepted
that parties expect their legal communications with other parties that
share a common legal interest to remain privileged. The waiver analysis
should not differ depending on whether the parties with a common
interest are seeking legal advice for a lawsuit or to ensure advance
compliance with the law.
By determining that the common interest doctrine need not coincide
with the full disclosure purpose of the attorney-client privilege, the
majority is also at odds with the spirit of Upjohn. Upjohn indicates that
the scope of third-party waiver has to do with the client’s state of
mind.245 The state of mind required is that of seeking legal advice, which
occurs in a variety of contexts. Nowhere in formulations of attorneyclient privilege or third-party waiver does the common law require
anticipation of litigation. The common interest doctrine acknowledges
that clients’ states of mind while engaging in legal communications with
parties that share a common interest are that these communications will
remain private—and this is true whether or not the legal communications
involve litigation, or something completely different.
The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is the same in both
litigation and non-litigation contexts,246 and the common interest
doctrine should not turn on that distinction. Either the common interest
doctrine serves the purposes of the attorney-client privilege in both
contexts, or in neither. In short, the litigation requirement does not serve
the purpose of the attorney-client privilege “to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote
broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice.”247
B.

The Risk That the Common Interest Doctrine Will Over-Protect
Communications Is Low Because It—Like the Attorney-Client
Privilege Itself—Does Not Shield Non-Legal Communications or
Underlying Facts

The common interest doctrine does not sweep too broadly absent the
litigation requirement. The Ambac majority asserted that applying the
common interest doctrine to non-litigation-related legal communications
“could result in the loss of evidence of a wide range of communications
between parties who assert common legal interests but who really have
245. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
246. See id. at 389.
247. Id.
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only nonlegal or exclusively business interests to protect.”248 However,
the common interest doctrine cannot and does not protect
communications that would not have been privileged in the first place.
“Where a communication neither invited nor expressed any legal
opinion whatsoever, but involved the mere soliciting or giving of
business advice, it is not privileged” by the attorney-client privilege.249
The common interest doctrine is the same—the “common interest” must
be legal in nature,250 attorneys must be present, and any disclosure to a
client with a common interest absent still waives the privilege.
Additionally, the communications must be for the purpose of securing
legal advice, so business communications with only a tangential legal
element are not protected.251 The common interest doctrine does not
operate to shield the underlying facts of communications after those
communications have been disclosed to a third party because the
attorney-client privilege itself does not shield underlying facts.252
Given these restraints on the common interest doctrine, Ambac’s
concern that it might shield business communications is somewhat
confounding. The majority asserted that applying the common interest
doctrine to non-litigation-related legal communications “could result in
the loss of evidence of a wide range of communications between parties
who assert common legal interests but who really have only nonlegal or
exclusively business interests to protect.”253 The Ambac majority did
not—and indeed, could not—give examples or point to actual cases
where the common interest doctrine was applied to “non-legal or
exclusively business” communications254 because the common interest
doctrine—and the attorney-client privilege itself—simply does not apply
in those circumstances.255
Absent the possibility of the common interest doctrine applying to
non-legal communications, the Ambac majority’s concern with
248. Ambac Assur. Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30, 38 (N.Y. 2016). This
statement is somewhat confounding given that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to
nonlegal communications in the first place.
249. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359–60 (D. Mass. 1950).
250. King, supra note 55, at 1412–13.
251. Id.
252. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 69 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.
2000); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395–96 (1981).
253. Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 38 (emphasis added).
254. See generally Ambac, 57 N.E.3d.
255. The attorney-client privilege only covers communications for the purpose of securing legal
advice, not business advice. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359
(D. Mass. 1950).
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overbroad application of the common interest doctrine is misguided.
While there may be a higher likelihood that communications absent the
threat of litigation are for a business (nonlegal) purpose,256 claims of
privilege for those communications will not necessarily succeed. Courts
can adequately assess each claim of privilege as they do in any other
circumstance and reject those without merit.
C.

Ambac’s Litigation Requirement Creates Arbitrary Outcomes,
Harms the Public Interest, and Encourages Gamesmanship

A simple hypothetical exposes the practical consequences of Ambac’s
formulation of the litigation requirement. Imagine that Entity One and
Entity Two are corporations that have signed a merger agreement.
Assume the entities share a common legal interest in ensuring that the
merger complies with all applicable laws and regulations. The CEO of
Entity One (CEO One) goes to a meeting with the CEO of Entity Two
(CEO Two) and attorneys for both corporations. At the meeting, CEO
One and CEO Two seek legal advice from their attorneys on how to
ensure that the merger complies with applicable securities laws. The
meeting goes well, and CEO One is optimistic about the merger. As he
leaves the meeting, he checks his phone and discovers an e-mail from a
lawyer containing a threat to sue on behalf of Entity One shareholders
and alleging that the merger agreement violates securities laws. Under
Ambac, in discovery, the communications in the meeting are not covered
by the common interest doctrine—even though they were legal
communications with counsel—because they do not relate to pending or
anticipated litigation. The court orders Entity One to disclose the
conversations during discovery.
Now imagine the same set of facts, except this time, CEO One
happens to check his phone right before walking into the meeting. He
discovers the litigation threat that alleges securities violations. He then
walks into the meeting and promptly tells CEO Two and Entity Two’s
attorneys, “I just got word we are being sued already for securities
violations. We really need to make sure we remain in compliance with
securities laws as we go forward.” The rest of the meeting proceeds as it
did in the first hypothetical. Under Ambac, the communications in this
scenario are likely covered by the common interest doctrine because

256. Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 38 (citing James M. Fischer, The Attorney-Client Privilege Meets the
Common Interest Arrangement: Protecting Confidences While Exchanging Information for Mutual
Gain, 16 REV LITIG 631, 642 (1997)) (“[I]n a non-litigation setting the danger is greater that the
underlying communication will be for a commercial purpose rather than for securing legal advice.”).
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they relate to “pending or anticipated litigation.” The court upholds
Entity One’s claim of attorney-client privilege for the conversations.
This hypothetical underscores the consequences of Ambac’s formulation
of the litigation requirement. Whether the attorney-client privilege
protects Entity One and Two’s legal communications at the meeting
depended solely on when CEO One happened to check his e-mail.
The arbitrary nature of the litigation requirement is harmful to clients,
but it is also harmful to the public. The public interest in observance of
law can be substantial in many nonlitigation contexts. For example,
corporations that have agreed to undergo a substantial merger share a
common legal interest in the surviving entity complying with all laws
and regulations—a legal purpose that serves the ends of the merging
entities, shareholders, and society.257 To accomplish their shared legal
interest in compliance with the law, it is necessary that merging entities
and their separate counsel share and cooperate on legal strategy—the
sheer number and complexity of shared legal obligations requires it.258
Companies in this situation have a critical interest in retaining their
attorney-client privilege during the pre-closing process. But Ambac’s
holding ensures that the threat that all such communications may be
subject to protracted discovery in a future lawsuit discourages these
entities from disclosing the facts necessary for their attorneys to give
sound legal advice and ensure compliance with the law. This result
harms not just the parties but also the public as a whole, which has an
interest in corporate entities following the law.
Even in areas riddled with litigation, the doctrine does not apply
under Ambac’s formulation unless there is a threat of specific
litigation.259 In recent years, a significant percentage of mergers and
acquisitions were the target of merger objection suits.260 Between 2011
and 2014, over ninety percent of mergers valued over $100 million were
subject to shareholder suits (although that number declined to sixty-four
percent in the first half of 2016).261 Many of these cases settle, but some

257. See King, supra note 55, at 1433 n.132 (“Heavy government regulation of corporations
increases the likelihood of government litigation against corporations, but also renders corporations
more vulnerable to suit by private parties.”); Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.
258. King, supra note 55, at 1433 n.132. See also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.
259. Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 38.
260. Ravi Sinha, Shareholder Litigation Involving Acquisitions of Public Companies: Review of
2015 and 1H 2016 M&A Litigation, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 1, http://www.cornerstone.com/
Publications/Reports/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Acquisitions-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
5T9A-DL5F].
261. Id.
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cases result in extremely large judgments.262 But Ambac rejected Bank
of America’s argument that the constant threat of litigation in mergers
met the anticipated litigation requirement.263 The result is an incentive
for entities that share a common legal interest in complying with the law
to not fully communicate with each other’s attorneys, leading to less
effective legal advice and unintentional noncompliance with the law.
By requiring the threat of specific litigation, the litigation requirement
encourages plaintiffs to withhold notification of planned litigation until
the last possible moment, and possibly even to delay filing a lawsuit.
Recall the hypothetical above about the meeting between CEO One,
CEO Two, and their lawyers. Now imagine that the plaintiffs are aware
of Ambac’s litigation requirement. Instead of emailing the Complaint to
CEO One on the day of the meeting, the plaintiffs may decide to delay
threatening litigation or filing their Complaint until the last possible
moment. During that time, CEO One, CEO Two, and their attorneys
hold several more meetings where they discuss compliance with
securities laws. Under Ambac, all of those legal communications are
waived.
Control over waiver of the attorney-client privilege should be in the
hands of the party seeking legal advice.264 By requiring an actual threat
of litigation by a particular legal adversary to invoke the common
interest doctrine, Ambac’s formulation of the litigation requirement
strips that control from the client and places it with the client’s legal
adversaries. Under Ambac, it is the adversary’s threat of litigation that
triggers the common interest doctrine for legal communications
postdating that threat.265 A legal adversary planning to sue in a
jurisdiction where New York State rules of evidence apply need only
wait as long as possible to bring the suit in order to gain full discovery of
legal communications that would have been shielded under the common
interest doctrine if the adversary threatened litigation earlier. In this way,
the litigation requirement is contrary to the longstanding formulation of
the privilege as the client’s to control, and it leads to arbitrary
application of the privilege.
262. See, e.g., Am.’s Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d. 1213 (Del. 2012) (affirming judgment
for shareholders of over $2 billion in damages and over $304 million in attorney’s fees); In re S.
Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 2011 WL 6866900 (Del. Ch. Dec. 29, 2011)
(awarding $1.347 billion, plus interest and attorneys’ fees).
263. Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 38.
264. Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege: Continuing Confusion About Attorney
Communications, Drafts, Pre-Existing Documents, and the Source of the Facts Communicated, 48
AM. U. L. REV. 967, 979 (1999) (citations omitted).
265. Ambac, 57 N.E.3d at 38.

15 - Franz.docx (Do Not Delete)

2017]

5/28/2017 3:40 PM

LIMITATION TO THE COMMON INTEREST DOCTRINE

1023

CONCLUSION
Ambac provides an alluring sense of clarity for an otherwise muddled
doctrine. However, that clarity comes with a cost: Ambac’s litigation
requirement is based on a misunderstanding of the nature of the common
interest doctrine and results in arbitrary restrictions on the attorney-client
privilege. This arbitrary application has real costs: it disincentivizes full
disclosure that is the purpose of the privilege in the first place, and
promotes gamesmanship by encouraging plaintiffs to notify defendants
of litigation at the last possible moment.
For these reasons, New York and jurisdictions that have adopted a
litigation requirement should reconsider it. Moreover, jurisdictions that
have not yet addressed the litigation requirement or the common interest
doctrine itself should reject the litigation requirement from the outset.266
Finally, and as other scholars have urged, courts, legislators, and
scholars should continue to strive for a common terminology that clearly
defines the common interest doctrine as defining the scope of the
attorney-client privilege, not as an exception to its waiver.

266. See supra Part V.
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APPENDIX
Table 2:
The Litigation Requirement in the States267
State
Alabama268
Alaska269
Arizona270
Arkansas271
California272
Colorado273
Connecticut274
Delaware275
Florida276
Georgia277

Position on the Litigation Requirement
Unclear
Rejected
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine
Adopted
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine
Rejected
Unclear
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine

267. Given the variety of state positions on the common interest doctrine and the litigation
requirement, a disclaimer is necessary. This table only counts states as having adopted the common
interest doctrine or a litigation requirement if it is enshrined in a statute or recognized by the highest
court in the state. Additionally, the common interest doctrine may evolve more quickly in some
states after New York’s decision in Ambac v. Countrywide. See infra Part V. Therefore, this table is
meant only as a guide and a useful starting point; scholars and practitioners should carefully
research lower court opinions in the relevant states before relying on this table for a definitive
statement of the doctrine.
268. Alabama’s privilege statute closely follows the URE language but omits “pending action,”
suggesting that the common interest doctrine might apply in a non-litigation context. ALA. R. EVID.
502(b)(3). However, the Advisory Committee’s Notes cite a Seventh Circuit opinion that states that
the section should be “broadly applied to cover any mutual interest that may promote the trial
strategies of the parties,” which suggests the opposite. Note to ALA. R. EVID. 502(b)(3) (quoting
United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979)). The Alabama Supreme Court has not
interpreted the provision.
269. ALASKA R. EVID. 503(b)(3).
270. ARIZ. R. EVID. 502 (The Arizona Court of Appeals adopted the doctrine with no litigation
requirement. See Lund v. Donahoe, 261 P.3d 456, 464 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011)).
271. ARK. R. EVID. 502(b)(3).
272. CAL. EVID. CODE § 954 (West 2017) (A California Court of Appeals opinion refers to the
common interest doctrine and the “joint client” exceptions as one and the same. See, e.g., Walters
Wholesale Elec. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 247 F.R.D. 593, 597 (C.D. Cal. 2008)).
273. COLO. R. EVID. 502.
274. CONN. CODE EVID. § 5-1.
275. DEL. R. EVID. 502(b).
276. Florida has not taken a position on the litigation requirement. FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (2017).
277. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-5-501 (2017).
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State
Hawaii278
Idaho279
Illinois280
Indiana281
Iowa282
Kansas283
Kentucky284
Louisiana285
Maine286
Maryland287
Massachusetts288
Michigan289
Minnesota290
Mississippi291
Missouri292

1025

Position on the Litigation Requirement
Adopted
Rejected
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine
Adopted
Rejected
Adopted
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine
Rejected
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine
Adopted
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine

278. HAW. R. EVID. 503(b)(3); see also Boston Auction Co., Ltd. v. Western Farm Credit Bank,
925 F. Supp. 1478, 1483–84 (D. Haw. 1996).
279. IDAHO R. EVID. 502(b)(3). Note 1 explains that the original provision was amended to
expand the scope to cover “all communications,” not just those related to litigation.
280. ILL. R. EVID. 502.
281. IND. R. EVID. 502.
282. IOWA R. EVID. 5.502.
283. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-426 (2017).
284. KY. R. EVID. 503(b)(3).
285. LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 506(B) (2017).
286. ME. R. EVID. 502(b)(3).
287. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-108 (West 2017).
288. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected the litigation requirement. Hanover Ins.
Co. v. Rapo & Jepsen Ins. Servs., Inc., 870 N.E.2d 1105, 1110–12, (Mass. 2007); see also MASS. R.
EVID. 502(b) (adopting the Restatement approach that rejects the litigation requirement).
289. MICH. R. EVID. 501.
290. MINN. STAT. § 595.02(b) (2017).
291. MISS. R. EVID. 502(b)(3)(A)–(B) (requiring a “pending case” as opposed to a “pending
action”); see also Hewes v. Langston, 853 So. 2d 1237, 1244 (Miss. 2003).
292. MO. REV. STAT. § 491.060 (2017).
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State
Montana293
Nebraska294
Nevada295
New Hampshire296
New Jersey297
New Mexico298
New York299
North Carolina300
North Dakota301
Ohio302
Oklahoma303
Oregon304
Pennsylvania305
Rhode Island306
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Position on the Litigation Requirement
Unclear
Rejected
Rejected
Adopted
Adopted
Rejected
Adopted
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine
Rejected
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine
Rejected
Rejected
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine

293. Montana has not taken a position on the litigation requirement. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 261-803 (2017); Am. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Montana Thirteenth Judicial Dist. Court, 280 P.3d 240, 244–
47 (Mt. 2012) (citing various state courts on the common interest doctrine but not adopting a
specific rule on the litigation requirement).
294. NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-503(2) (2017).
295. NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.095(3) (2017).
296. N.H. R. EVID. 502(b)(3).
297. New Jersey courts have imposed a litigation requirement. See O’Boyle v. Borough of
Longport, 94 A.3d 299 (N.J. 2014) (noting that the common interest doctrine “applies to
communications between attorneys for different parties if the disclosure is made due to actual or
anticipated litigation for the purpose of furthering a common interest”).
298. N.M. R. EVID. 11-503(B).
299. New York courts have imposed a litigation requirement. See Ambac Assur. Corp. v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 57 N.E.3d 30 (N.Y. 2016); see also supra Part V.
300. North Carolina has not addressed the issue by statute or in the North Carolina Supreme
Court.
301. N.D. R. EVID. 502(b)(3).
302. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (West 2017).
303. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2502(B)(3) (2017).
304. OR. R. EVID. 503(2).
305. PA. R. EVID. 501.
306. Rhode Island has not yet addressed the issue by statute or in the Rhode Island Supreme
Court.
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State
South Carolina307
South Dakota308
Tennessee309

Position on the Litigation Requirement
Rejected
Adopted
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine

Texas310
Utah311
Vermont312
Virginia313
Washington314
West Virginia315
Wisconsin316
Wyoming317

Rejected
Adopted
Adopted
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine
Unclear
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine
Rejected
Not adopted the civil common interest doctrine

307. The South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the litigation requirement. Tobaccoville USA,
Inc. v. McMaster, 692 S.E.2d 526, 531 (S.C. 2010) (“When the common interest doctrine applies, it
operates as an exception to any potential waiver of privilege, regardless of the subject matter of the
present litigation.”).
308. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-19-502(b)(3) (2017).
309. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3-105 (2017).
310. TEX. R. EVID. 502(b)(1)(C); see also In re XL Specialty Ins. Co., 373 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex.
2012) (“[O]ur privilege is not a ‘common interest’ privilege that extends beyond litigation.”).
311. UTAH R. EVID. 504(b)(2).
312. VT. R. EVID. 502(b)(3).
313. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.7 (2017).
314. Washington courts have applied the common interest doctrine for litigation-related
communications, but have not addressed whether the common interest doctrine covers other legal
communications. See State v. Emmanuel, 42 Wash. 2d 799, 815, 259 P.2d 845, 855 (1953).
315. W. VA. R. EVID. 501. Additionally, a West Virginia opinion describes the “common interest
doctrine” as applying to situations in which a lawyer represents multiple clients—contrary to the
usual formulation involving separate attorneys. See State ex rel. Brison v. Kaufman, 584 S.E.2d
480, 492 (W.V. 2003) (“Under the common interest doctrine, when an attorney acts for two
different parties who each have a common interest, communications by either party to the attorney
are not necessarily privileged in a subsequent controversy between the two parties.”) (citations
omitted).
316. WIS. STAT. § 905.03(2) (2017).
317. WYO. R. EVID. 501.

